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Dynamic Pricing in Shared Mobility on Demand
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Han Qiu, Ruimin Li, and Jinhua Zhao
Abstract—We consider a profit maximization problem in an
urban mobility on-demand service, of which the operator owns
a fleet, provides both exclusive and shared trip services, and
dynamically determines prices of offers. With knowledge of the
traveler preference and the distribution of future trip requests,
the operator wants to find the pricing strategy that optimizes the
total operating profit of multiple trips during a specific period,
namely, a day in this paper. This problem is first formulated and
analyzed within the dynamic programming framework, where
a general approach combining parametric rollout policy and
stochastic optimization is proposed. A discrete-choice-based price
optimization model is then used for the request level optimal
decision problem and leads to a practical and computationally
tractable algorithm for the problem.
Our algorithm is evaluated with a simulated experiment in
the urban traffic network in Langfang, China, and it is shown to
generate considerably higher profit than naive strategies. Further
analysis shows that this method also leads to higher congestion
level and lower service capacity in the urban traffic system, which
highlights a need for policy interventions that balance the private
profit making and the system level optimality.
Index Terms—Mobility on demand service, shared mobility,
dynamic pricing, dynamic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
LATELY, shared mobility and mobility on-demand (MoD)services have become popular topics in the transportation
community. Intuitively, given same amount of vehicle supply,
shared mobility has the potential to increase service capacity
and reduce congestion. Fagnant et al. [1], [2] used simula-
tion to investigate the extent to which shared autonomous
vehicles (SAV), under certain operation rules, can improve
transportation efficiencies. Subsequently, they [3] further in-
cluded dynamic ride sharing in the simulation to show that
SAV can also be profitable for the private operator. Alonso
et al. [4] investigated online matching and dispatching with
the view of optimizing the service rate/capacity, and showed
that the algorithm could improve the service capacity by a
factor of three. However, these studies are overly optimistic
as they ignore the private interest of operators by solely
focusing on system-level metrics such as service capacity. For
example, even though we can optimize operation to increase
the capacity with shared mobility, such an operation might be
economically sub-optimal for a private operator. This research
aims to explicitly model the profit-driven perspective of a
private operator and examine the impact of such a profit-driven
operation on the performance of the urban traffic system.
Various research efforts have been devoted to optimizing
the operations of mobility service operators. There are two
major settings: one-sided, or two-sided markets, depending on
whether the operator has full control power over the supply.
Specifically, one-sided market refers to case in which the
operator can manage its fleet in a direct and centralized way
and solely transacts with the travelers, while two-sided market
refers to the case where the operator is a matching platform
and it does business with both drivers and travelers. In this
paper, we focus on the one-sided market setting which re-
quires less modeling complexity and admits tractable problem
formulations in operation management; for readers interested
in the two-sided market setting, we refer them to some recent
works in [5]–[8].
Existing studies usually focus on a specific sub-problem
instead of formulating the general operation problem integrat-
ing dispatching, pricing and rebalancing. Among them, many
address the dispatching problem, which is closely related to
the traditional vehicle routing problem. One example of the
dispatching problem is dial-a-ride problems (DARP). A recent
review by Cordeau and Laporte [9] summarizes attempts
on this problem. In terms of revenue management, Atasoy
et al. [10] formulated a profit maximization problem with
request-level assortment optimization to address the difference
between single passenger and shared services. Smith et al. [11]
introduced a fluid model and based on which they developed
mathematic programs to optimally rebalance fleet.
This paper presents a formulation of the total profit maxi-
mization problem over multiple trips during a day (in contrast
to the single request level optimization) of an urban mobility
on-demand service. In this problem, we focus on the dy-
namic pricing strategies of the operator and the corresponding
traveler choice behavior. We utilize dynamic programming
and choice-based price optimization models [12] to develop
a tractable algorithm, and our experiment validates the effec-
tiveness of the proposed algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section II and
III present the problem formulation and the algorithm. Section
IV evaluates the algorithm in a simulated urban road network
in Langfang, China, and examine how the proposed method
compares with the myopic pricing strategy and other naive
strategies both in terms of the total profit and the impact on
traffic congestion and road capacity.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a monopolistic private MoD service operator in
an urban transportation market. This operator owns a fleet of
(identical) vehicles and provides on-demand travel services.
There are two types of service: single or shared. Specifically,
each vehicle can provide at most 1 single service at a time,
but can serve several shared trips up to its capacity limit, e.g.,
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3 parties. Vehicle can only provide one type of service at a
time, but can change its service type during the course of the
day. We consider the problem of finding the optimal pricing
strategy of services for each trip request to maximize the total
operating profit over a specific period, e.g., a day. We further
make the following assumption to simplify the setting and
make the problem tractable:
(1) Traveler or other transportation service provider such
as transit agency follow fixed strategies and will not react to
different strategies of the operator.
(2) The operator has complete knowledge of the origin-
destination distribution of potential trip requests, and the
background traffic density (contributed by those not exposed
to this MoD service) at each link, at any time. It also has an
accurate model of the population traveler choice behavior.
(3) For each vehicle, the operator only controls the as-
signment of confirmed trips. When providing service, vehicle
selects the path with shortest travel time by itself, and then
stops at wherever the last passengers disembark and remains
idle until the next trip assignment.
Now we formulate our problem formally. Assume during
the targeting period (e.g., a day), the operator receives N trip
requests i1, i2, · · · , iN at time t1 < t2 < · · · < tN . N is
a random variable, and each ik is a random tuple consist of
trip origin and destination. Assume right after the time tk−1
of request ik−1, the operator has knowledge of current state
Yk, which includes current time tk−1, fleet status such as the
location of each vehicle and details of its assigned trips. Given
Yk, the probability distribution of next request ik along with
the arrival time tk can be completely determined by the new
state (ik, tk) ∼ P ′(·|Yk). At time tk right before receiving
the request ik, system state change to Xk = f ′(Yk, tk):
for example, some vehicles move to new location and finish
service; some vehicles pick up their passengers. Notation X
contains same information as Y is used only to distinguish
between the relationships with request i: X refers to state
before receiving i and Y refers to state after finishing i, i.e.,
confirmation of trip details or rejection of services.
Since not all service options are available to ik according
to Xk, we therefore define the feasible set Ck(ik, Xk) as the
collection of feasible service along with the corresponding trip
plan. For example, if both single service and shared service
are available, Ck will contain two elements corresponding to
the trip details of single and shared services respectively. One
should note that, even there might be several vehicles available
for the same service, in the feasible set we only consider one,
which is the best according to some predefined operation rules.
Given Ck, the operator tries to generate offer prices uk for
Ck based on a policy pi, current request ik, and current state
Xk with uk = pi(ik, Xk) ∈ R|Ck(ik,Xk)|. Then, the traveler
will choose among the feasible services in Ck, or reject
the offer and consider alternatives, such as driving, taking
taxi, or cancelation of the trip. This selection is characterized
by a (probabilistic) choice model wk ∼ P (·|uk, Ck). For a
realization of choice wk ∈ Ck or wk = reject, we can
calculate the operating profit from this request with g(uk, wk),
and update the state after request with Yk+1 = f(Xk, wk). Our
State	
Yk-1	
Price	
uk	
Choice	
wk	
f	P	P	’,	f	’	 π	 Time	
Variables:	
Operations:	 tk-1	
State	
Yk	
tk	 tk	 tk	 tk	
Request	ik	State	Xk	Feasible	Set	Ck	
Fig. 1. Request Level Dynamics
X	
Y	
i	
t	
C	
u	
w	
f	
f	'	
P	
P	’	
π	
Fig. 2. Dependency of Variables
objective is to maximize the sum of operating profit
J∗ = max
pi
J(pi)
= max
pi
Ei1,t1,w1,··· ,iN ,tN ,wN {
N∑
k=1
g(pi(ik, Xk), wk)}.
(1)
For reader’s convenience, we show the dynamic through
time in the Figure 1, and the dependency of variables in Figure
2.
III. ALGORITHMS
To arrive at tractable solutions, we first unroll the equation
(1) into request-wise form, where the process of each request
is modeled by the loop Y → i, t→ X → u→ w → Y . If we
use J∗(Y ) to represent the optimal expected total profit in the
future given state Y , we can write down the following Bellman
Equation [13], which states that current expected total profit
consists of expected request level profit for next request, and
future expected total profit
J∗(Y ) = Ei,t|Y { max
u∈U(C)
Ew|u,C{g(u,w) + J∗(f(X,w))}}.
where X = f ′(Y, t). The optimal, non-myopic request-wise
decision for a specific request i at time tis then given by
u∗ = arg max
u∈U(C)
Ew|u,C{g(u,w) + J∗(f(X,w))}. (2)
Thus, if the request level subproblem
max
u∈U(C)
Ew|u,C{g(u,w)} (3)
given C is tractable, and if J∗(f(X,w)) can be obtained in a
tractable way, the optimal daily-level policy is also tractable. In
the following, we discuss the solution of (1) when subproblem
(3) can be solve efficiently by some subroutine; we defer the
discussion on tractable modeling of (3) to the next subsection.
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Such sequentially decision-making problem is common in
transportation research community; to name a few, there are
the pricing problem under vehicle routing problem framework
[14], the dial-a-ride problems (DARP) [15], and the joint
dispatching and pricing problem [16].
However, the optimal function J∗ is difficult to find in
practice, and problem-specific approximation approaches are
developed in all studies. Sayarshad and Chow [16] provide
an exhaustive summary of recent attempts. In this paper,
rather than to approximate optimal value function J∗, we
conduct approximation directly in the policy space. We notice
that, each parametric approximation Jˆ(·|θ) with parameter θ,
combined with the request level subproblem, provides us a
rollout policy pˆiθ
pˆiθ(i,X) = arg max
u∈U(C)
Ew|u,C{g(u,w) + Jˆ(f(X,w)|θ)}.
We can therefore evaluate pˆiθ with simulation and optimize
θ with any reasonable optimization methods, such as those of
stochastic optimization. This approach is tractable and compa-
rably easier to implement; however, it restricts the policy space
and in general we cannot know if this approximation will lead
to great gap in performance. Moreover, when the parameter
space is large, the optimization become fairly difficult as the
evaluation function is indeed a blackbox.
To resolve such potential problems, we introduce an efficient
parametric method by utilizing a special structure of our
problem. Since w ∼ P (·|u,C) relates to the realization of
a selection, the request level optimal control problem (2)
can further decomposed into option-level. If, for each trip
option o in C, we use J˜∗(o,X) and p(o|u,C) to represent its
expected value function and selection probability respectively,
and J˜∗(0, X), p(0|u,C) for rejection, we can write (2) as
follows
u = arg max
u∈U(C)
{
∑
o∈C
p(o|u,C)[g(u, o) + J˜∗(o,X)]
+ p(0|u,C)J˜∗(0, X)}
= arg max
u∈U(C)
{
∑
o∈C
p(o|u,C)[g(u, o) + J˜∗(o,X)]
+ (1−
∑
o∈C
p(o|u,C))J˜∗(0, X)}
= arg max
u∈U(C)
∑
o∈C
p(o|u,C)[g(u, o) + J˜∗(o,X)
− J˜∗(0, X)]
Now, we can further define opportunity cost function A˜∗ to
replace the expected value function J˜∗:
A˜∗(o,X) = J˜∗(0, X)− J˜∗(o,X),∀o ∈ C.
A˜∗ evaluates the difference of only a single choice selection
and it is therefore feasible to approximate it by local informa-
tion, which is certainly of lower dimension than the global
information which is required to describe J˜∗.
We now summarize our approach: we consider the fol-
lowing parametric representation Aˆ(o, Xˆ|θ) with parameter
θ = {θs, θsh}
Aˆ(o, Xˆ|θ) =
{
θTs Xˆ o is of type single
θTshXˆ o is of type shared
along with rollout policy
piθ(i,X) = arg max
u∈U(C)
∑
o∈C
p(o|u,C)[g(u, o)− Aˆ(o, Xˆ|θ)]
(4)
where Xˆ = (λot, λdt, sot, 1/vot, 1/vdt) is a local feature tuple
including local outflow demand intensity λot at origin o, local
outflow demand intensity λdt at destination d, local supply
capacity of the operator at origin sot, and local average travel
speed at both origin and destination vot, vdt. These local values
are the average of corresponding variable values at all nodes
within some radius r around the target node o or d. In this
paper, we select r to be 2 km.
As our representation of policy is now low-dimensional, we
select an episodic-updated stochastic optimization method to
optimize θ: for a given θ, we simulate an episode (i.e., a day) to
evaluate the corresponding policy piθ with J(piθ), and then use
the evaluation to update θ by Covariance Matrix Adaptation
Evolution Strategy (CMA-ES) method [17], [18].
A. Request Level Subproblem
To complete our algorithm, in this subsection we introduce
a tractable model for the request level subproblem. First, let
us recall that subproblem (3), in option-level, is of the form
max
u∈U(C)
∑
o∈C
p(o|u,C)g(u, o)
Next, we will introduce price optimization problem under
multinomial logit choice model, and show that this problem
is suitable and tractable in our setting. For notation simplicity,
in the following discussion we assume C = {o1, · · · , on} and
use shorthand j to represent option oj ; the corresponding price
is denoted as uj . The formulation above is therefore simplified
as
max
u∈Rn
n∑
j=1
p(j|uj)g(uj , j)
Assume for each option j, there are several values of
interest to the traveler and the operator: service type yj ∈
{single, shared}, standard fare fj ∈ R+, operating cost
cj ∈ R+, fare adjustment δj ∈ R, and travel time, i.e., the
difference between the estimated arrival time and the current
time, Tj ∈ R+. We first clarify the variable from the constants:
rather than considering uj = fj + δj , we let uj = δj and only
consider δj as variable, while all other are given constant.
Next, we develop the exact form of both g(uj , j) and
p(j|uj). We let g(uj , j) to be the profit g(uj , j) = Rj =
fj + δj − cj , and model p(j|uj) with the multinomial logit
model (MNL) [19]–[21]:
p(j|uj) = e
Uj∑n
k=1 e
Uk + eU0
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 4
where the utility Uj of the option j is in form Uyj (fj , δj , Tj),
and U0 is the utility for rejection and given as constant.
With all these details, the request level problem reduces to
max
δ∈Rn
∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δj)(fj − cj + δj)∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δj) + eU0
(5)
This problem is tractable and has good properties when the
utility function Uy with respect to variable δ is continuous
and monotonically decreasing for each service type y. We first
review an important existing proposition:
Proposition 1: ([22]–[24]) If the utility function Uy with re-
spect to variable δ is continuous and monotonically decreasing
for each service type y, to solve problem (5) is equivalent to
solve the following equation in z
eU0z = max
δ∈Rn
n∑
j=1
eUj(δj)(fj − cj − z + δj) (6)
The proof can be found in the appendix. Proposition 1
admits an easy algorithm for a class of utility function speci-
fication:
Proposition 2: For the problem (5) with utility Uj = Uj0 +
Eyj (δj) where Uj0 = U
′
yj (fj , Tj) is constant for all j, and
Ey(x) = −ey1 min{0, x}−ey2 max{0, x} with ey2 > ey1 > 0
for all service type y, the optimal objective value z∗ can be
solved by the following iterative algorithm:
δk+1j =

zk − fj + cj + 1/eyj1 zk − fj + cj + 1/eyj1 < 0
zk − fj + cj + 1/eyj2 zk − fj + cj + 1/eyj2 > 0
0 otherwise
(7)
zk+1 =
∑n
j=1 Vj0e
Eyj (δ
k+1
j )(fj − cj + δk+1j )∑n
j=1 Vj0e
Eyj (δ
k+1
j ) + V0
(8)
where Vj0 = eUj0 , V0 = eU0 .
IV. SIMULATED EXPERIMENT
We conduct a simulated experiment in a medium-sized
city Langfang in China to assess the performance of our
algorithm. We first use existing trajectory data of Langfang to
calibrate the agent-based simulation system, and then generate
different scenarios for validation of the algorithm. In the
following subsections, we briefly discuss the implementation
of simulation system, and explain the results.
A. Experiment Setup
To simplify the simulation flow, we discretize the time
into minutes and simulate by time steps. At each time step,
new demand for the MoD service is generated based on an
underlying demand distribution, processed by the operator, and
the resulted new passenger trips are stored into the database.
After all demand are processed, the system retrieve the alive
passenger trips from the database and update the location of
corresponding vehicles. The system then ends this time step
by updating the network status with an internal speed-density
model and the background traffic density. The structure of our
simulation system can be described by the flowchart in Figure
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Fig. 4. Data Location
3. To ensure efficient training of our algorithm, we further
implement following simplification in our simulation system:
(I) We consider driving and taking a taxi as the only travel
models and ignore public transportation, walking and cycling
to reduce modeling complexity.
(II) We simplify the road network to a square grid of 10×10
considering the scale (∼ 7km × 7km) and the shape (Figure
4) of the city. The original nodes are mapped into nodes in
the grid with proper rescaling and rotating.
(III) We use a triangular flow-density model [25] for the
speed-density dynamics. Specifically, given the free flow den-
sity limit km, congestion density limit kc, and free flow speed
vm, the flow-density relationship between flow q and density
k can be described as follows:
q =
{
vmk k < km
kc−k
kc−km vmkm km < k < kc
(IV) We use a linear function to combine the traffic density
in the simulation with the background traffic density. For time
t and link l, the estimated travel density kˆtl is calculated as
kˆtl = (1− ϕ)ktl + 1
k0
k′tl
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where ktl is the density derived from the background travel
time, k′tl is the density of vehicle/trips in the simulator,
and ϕ is the market exposure rate of the operator’s service,
which quantifies the share of the population that can be
represented by the simulation process. Conversion factor k0
is a parameter to ensure that k′tl and ktl have the same scale,
as in simulation we generally model much fewer vehicles to
reduce computation requirement. We calibrate this factor to
make the background travel time distribution consistent across
different market exposure rate ϕ. The value of k0 for specific
setting is reported along with the result in next section.
As introduced above, the simulation system takes back-
ground traffic density and the distribution of travel demand as
inputs. We obtain these input from our dataset, which consists
of real trajectory data of private trips in the Langfang central
region on a normal day. There are about 250,000 trip records in
total, and each record is a tuple consisting of series of location
identified code and series of time stamps in seconds, i.e.,
({l1, · · · , ln}, {t1, · · · , tn}). Figure 5 shows the distribution
of trips across time.
To obtain the demand distributions, we extract the origin and
destination information from the trajectory records and then
aggregate them for each time step. Such information is then
normalized and smoothened to form demand distributions for
each OD pair between cells in the grid at each time step. We
reserve a degree of freedom by defining a rescaling factor M
to control the total number of trips in a day, which enable us to
balance between reducing computation burden and controlling
variances in the results.
To obtain the background travel density, we simply extract
and aggregate the link-level information at each time step from
trajectories. To deal with possible missing elements, we ap-
ply interpolation and extrapolation from nearby observations.
Finally, a uniform filter is applied to smoothen the density
distribution.
Next, we describe the parameters we selected for the exper-
iment.
1) MoD Service Operation: For operating cost, we only
consider cost of fuel (in following linear form)
c = cd · d
where cd is the unit distance cost and set to be $0.07/km
based on the current fuel costs ($1/L) [26] and standard fuel
efficiency (7L/100km) [27] in China.
Both the fare for single services fs and that for shared
services fsh are related to distance d and time T
fs = rb + rd · d+ rt · T
fsh = (rb + rd · d+ rt · T )rsh
where rb, rd, rt are the base fare, the unit distance fare, and
the unit time fare for each trip and are set to be $1, $0.25/km,
and $0.01/min respectively based on the taxi fare structure
in Langfang [28]. rsh(< 1) is the uniform fare ratio between
shared services and single services and varies in different
scenario settings.
For operation, we have following rules. A maximum of three
parties are allowed to share one vehicle. For each request, the
operator searches for empty vehicle within a maximum pickup
distance of 5 km and non-empty vehicles with additional
capacity within a maximum pickup distance of 2 km. We also
restrict the maximum detour distance and time of shared trips,
which are defined as the difference between distance and travel
time of shared service and those of single service, to 2 km
and 5 mins respectively.
2) Specification for Traveler Behavior: We follow [10] to
specify a choice model considering the service type, travel
mode, travel time, and travel cost. We define the utility value
in the monetary unit for a realistic selection of parameters.
The detailed specification is shown below, where Us, Ush, Uo
and Un are the utilities of taking the single service, the shared
service, the original travel mode, or cancellation.
Us = µ(ASCs − V OT · Ts − fs − E(δs))
Ush = µ(ASCsh − bv,shV OT · Tsh − fsh − E(δsh))
Uo = µ(ASCo − V OT · To − bf,ofo)
Un = 0
In the specification above, factor V OT characterizes the
average value of time of this population and is set to be
$0.03/min, 70% of the average income ($2.5/hour) in Lang-
fang [29]–[31]. Factor µ is the scale factor and set to be 0.5
as in the work of Atasoy et al. [10]. The constant ASCs
characterize the utility not captured by travel time and cost,
and are set as ASCs = 4.5, ASCsh = 4, ASCo = 5.
E reflects the asymmetry in perception of utility between
upward and downward fare adjustment, and it is defined to be
a piecewise linear function
E(δ) =
{
e1δ δ < 0
e2δ δ > 0
with e2 = 2, e1 = 1. This function reflects the fact that people
are more sensitive towards price surges than price reductions
[32]. Specifically, in our simulation we assume travelers regard
price reductions as normal fare changes, whereas price surges
are considered as unexpected and generate twice disutility.
Factor bv,sh characterizes the relative time reliability of
shared services compared with single services and is define
to be ηsh/ηs, where ηsh is the ratio between the actual travel
time and the estimated travel time for shared services, and ηs
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is the ratio for single services. This ratio is set to be 1.2 based
on our simulation results in the context of Langfang.
Factor bf,o characterizes the average cost of the original
travel mode compared with driving and varies by individuals
and their car ownership, transit accessibility, etc. We control
this factor to specify different settings of attractiveness of other
alternatives for the population. A lower bf,o corresponds to
higher car ownership and lower cost of staying in the original
travel mode across the population, and launching the new
service has less impact; whereas a higher bf,o represents a
setting with lower car ownership, the original travel mode is
costly and the new service can have a greater impact. This
factor is determined in specific scenario setting.
3) Flow-density Model: Based on Langfang’s local traffic
situation we choose vm = 60km/h, km = 1veh/36m and
kc = 1veh/6m. Since the scale of k is irrelevant if we only
need the information of travel time, in the implementation we
use km = 1 and kc = 6 to simplify the computation.
B. Results
We implement this simulation system in C++, and simulate
each scenario on a separate Linux server in the cluster. Each
server has 64GB memory and a 8-core 2.0GHz CPU. In each
step of CMA-ES algorithm, 12 different θ are sampled and
for each the function J(piθ) is evaluated and averaged over
10 runs. In our experiment, with the number of total request
M = 100, 000, each step takes about 15 mins, and we allow
the the algorithm to run for 20 steps (5 hour).
Our algorithm is tested on several scenario settings, with
different combinations of fleet size N , shared service fare
ratio rsh, original cost factor bf,o, market exposure ϕ, and
background congestion levels ψC .
To reduce the variance in aggregate results from sim-
ulation, we set the potential request size to M =
100, 000. We then consider rsh ∈ {0.4, 0.6, 0.8} and N ∈
{500, 750, 1000, 1250}. We select these N based on the ob-
servation that for N > 1250, the increase in the number of
passengers with greater N becomes negligible.
We consider bf,o = 2.5, 5.0 to model the trip generation
ability of this MoD service (comparing with original mode).
We set the density adjustment factor k0 = 0.95, 0.8 corre-
spondingly to keep density combination process consistent.
ϕ and ψC are used to capture the potential impact of
the private MoD operation on system congestion level and
have the following range ϕ ∈ {10%, 20%, 40%}, ψC ∈
{Low, Medium, High} respectively. Each level of ψC is de-
rived by multiplying the background travel density of each
link by a certain factor: the low, medium, and high level of
ψC correspond to factor = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, respectively.
In comparison, we consider performance of basic strategies,
the myopic pricing strategy (PM) and the proposed optimal
pricing strategy (PO). Basic strategies include the one to
provide all feasible options if possible (S+Sh), to only provide
feasible single options (S), and to only provide feasible shared
options (Sh). We include several metrics to assess performance
on different aspects:
(I) the profit, revenue, and cost of the operations to assess
the financial performance of the private MoD operator;
(II) the number of passengers serviced, and the total travel
time and distance of the whole fleet to assess the operation
efficiency;
(III) the average waiting time (AWT) for pickup across
serviced passengers, which is defined to be gap between the
time of the trip confirmation and the time of actual pickup, to
assess the service quality;
(IV) the global capacity, defined to be the ratio ρ between
the number of trips realized (including single service, shared
service, and original travel modes), and the number of total
requests:
ρ =
Ms +Msh +Mo
Ms +Msh +Mo +Mn
where Ms, Msh, Mo, and Mn are the number of single trips,
shared trips, original trips, and trip cancellations from the
target population, respectively;
(V) the congestion level, defined to be the average system
unit link travel time
Tave =
∑
t
∑
e∈links ke,tTe,t∑
t
∑
e∈links ke,t
where Te,t and ke,t are the unit link travel time and density
for link e at time t, respectively;
(VI) the efficiency of sharing, measured by total reduced
trip distance ∆d, or the difference between the sum of (direct)
trip distance of realized trips and the total traveled distance
by vehicles
∆d =
∑
trip∈trips
dtrip −
∑
veh∈fleet
dveh.
The comparisons on operating metrics (I-III) are presented
as the percentage difference for selected strategies, compared
with the optimal pricing strategy (PO), averaged over 108
different settings of (N, rsh, ρ, ψC), under different bf,o in
Table I. The optimal pricing strategy consistently generates a
much higher profit than the other strategies, as expected; but
this comes at the cost of serving fewer trips. Interestingly, for
PO, the ratio between the total travel time and the total travel
distance of the fleet is smaller than that of others, which means
that PO attempts to avoid trips that pass through a congested
area. In terms of service quality, for PO, the average waiting
time for pickup is much shorter than that of others.
The comparisons on system level metrics (IV-VI) are pre-
sented in Figure 6. In this figure, circles correspond to different
strategies and settings of (N, rsh) under high market share and
high background congestion ρ = 40% and ψC = High. Each
circle has its radius proportional to ∆d, and its center pointed
by the percentage differences in Tave and ρ compared with the
background value in Table II (which referred to system without
the impact of the design MoD service. We only consider S+Sh
and Sh as benchmarks since they are more likely to have better
system performances, as shown in the Table I.
Figure 6 shows that, compared with those of other two,
points of PO are generally located in the bottom right side
and have smaller radii, indicating the system-level inefficiency
of PO. But these points are more closely clustered, implying
that dynamic pricing introduces robustness towards changes in
settings, such as those under severe congestion.
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TABLE I
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN OPERATING STATISTICS,
COMPARED WITH PO
bf,o = 2.5
Strategy S+Sh S Sh PM
Profit -11.18% -39.51% -26.10% -11.45%
Revenue -7.99% -39.32% -22.61% -8.22%
Cost 7.80% -37.81% -5.61% 8.42%
Serviced Passengers 22.09% -44.14% 15.40% 16.78%
Travel Distance 7.80% -37.81% -5.61% 8.42%
Travel Time 12.40% -30.54% -2.54% 12.16%
AWT, Pickup 13.65% -8.39% 10.70% 13.31%
bf,o = 5.0
Strategy S+Sh S Sh PM
Profit -16.80% -36.01% -25.52% -14.90%
Revenue -13.01% -33.98% -21.65% -11.75%
Cost 7.58% -21.96% -0.94% 5.86%
Serviced Passengers 25.51% -35.68% 24.03% 17.42%
Travel Distance 7.58% -21.96% -0.94% 5.86%
Travel Time 14.05% -13.31% 4.01% 12.07%
AWT, Pickup 17.71% 6.03% 14.01% 17.94%
TABLE II
BACKGROUND SYSTEM METRICS
bf,o = 2.5
ψC Tave(mins/km) ρ
Low 1.666 0.844
Medium 2.272 0.832
High 3.063 0.815
bf,o = 5.0
ψC Tave(mins/km) ρ
Low 1.662 0.745
Medium 2.277 0.725
High 3.088 0.699
V. CONCLUSION
We consider a profit maximization problem in shared
mobility on-demand service with dynamic pricing decisions,
and design an efficient algorithm to solve for near-optimal
strategies. Based on a simulated experiment in Langfang,
China, we show that the proposed optimal pricing strategy
(PO) has superior performance in profit compared with other
strategies. However, this strategy can lead to inefficiency of
the system, mainly because it has stricter criteria for providing
shared capacity. The conflict between the profit maximization
objective and the system capacity and efficiency objective
highlights the need to understand the perspective of the private
operator and potentially introduce policy interventions to better
align the two objectives.
There are many potential extensions of this work. First, in
our problem formulation, we assume that the operator has
full distributional knowledge of the demand. This assumption
is too strong in practice and a practical extension is to
consider simultaneous online estimation of behavior model and
behavior-model-based profit maximization [33]–[35].
Another extension is to integrate the pricing problem with
the dispatching problem. The optimal strategies of these two
problems should be closely related; in fact, in this work, our
optimal pricing strategy show the ability to allocate supply and
incentivize demand wisely. Thus we expect that the integrated
problem can be formulated and solved under similar non-
myopic and reinforced framework.
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Fig. 6. Congestion - Capacity Tradeoff among Strategies
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
1) From (5) to (6):
Assume the optimal value of (5) is z∗. By the optimality of
z∗, we know that for any δ ∈ Rn
z∗ >
∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δj)(fj − cj + δj)∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δj) + eU0
⇒eU0z∗ >
n∑
j=1
eUj(δj)(fj − cj − z∗ + δj)
But there is also some δ∗ that reach optimality for (5), so
we have
eU0z∗ = max
δ∈Rn
n∑
j=1
eUj(δj)(fj − cj − z∗ + δj)
which is exactly (6). Thus, z∗ is a solution of (6).
2) From (6) to (5):
If z∗ solves (6), we know that for every δ ∈ Rn,
eU0z∗ >
n∑
j=1
eUj(δj)(fj − cj − z∗ + δj)
⇒z∗ >
∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δj)(fj − cj + δj)∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δj) + eU0
,
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thus z∗ is an upper bound of (5). But there is also some δ∗
that reach optimality for the right-hand side of (6), so we must
have z∗ to be the strict upper bound of (5).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
By proposition 1, we only need to prove the process
converges into the solution of (6). We note that the left-hand
side of (6) is a monotonically increasing linear function of z
on R, whereas the right-hand side is a monotonically non-
increasing convex function of z on R. The later claim is
valid as the right-hand side is the element-wise maximum of
a collection of convex function
hδ(z) =
n∑
j=1
eUj(δj)(fj − cj − z + δj)
Thus, h(z) = maxδ∈Rn hδ(z)− eU0z is convex and mono-
tonically decreasing on R. Moreover, this function is positive
at z = 0, as maxδ∈Rn hδ(z) is positive for all z by
max
δ∈Rn
hδ(z) >
n∑
j=1
eUj(z+cj−fj+ε)ε > 0
with some ε > 0. Therefore, the zero of h(z) at R+ is
unique and can be solved by Newton method based on the
monotonicity and convexity of h(z)
zk+1 = zk − h(zk)/h′(zk)
= zk −
∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δ
k
j )(fj − cj − zk + δkj )− eU0zk
−∑nj=1 eUj(δkj ) − eU0
=
∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δ
k
j )(fj − cj + δkj )∑n
j=1 e
Uj(δkj ) + eU0
where δk = arg maxδ∈Rn hδ(zk). This is exactly (8) if we
expand eUj(δ
k
j ) to Vj0e
Eyj (δ
k
j ). We therefore remain to show
that δk is of form (7) under our assumption on the form of
Eyj as
δkj = arg max
δj∈R
eEyj (δj)(fj − cj − zk + δj) (9)
When Ey(x) = −ey1 min{0, x} − ey2 max{0, x} with
ey2 > ey1 > 0 for all service type y, the derivatives of the
function in (9) can be calculated separately on δj > 0 and
δj < 0, and is equal to
eyj1e
−eyj1δj (zk − fj + cj + 1/eyj1 − δj) δj < 0
eyj2e
−eyj2δj (zk − fj + cj + 1/eyj2 − δj) δj > 0
undefined δj = 0
Since 1/eyj1 > 1/eyj2, there will be at most one stationary
point δj . As the target function in (9) is second order differen-
tiable in R/{0}, the optimal δkj is the stationary point if there
is one, or is 0 if there is no stationary point, and the derivative
is positive when δj < 0 and negative when δj > 0. This is
exactly the cases given by (7).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REFERENCES
[1] D. J. Fagnant and K. M. Kockelman, “The travel and environmental
implications of shared autonomous vehicles, using agent-based model
scenarios,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies,
vol. 40, pp. 1–13, 2014.
[2] D. J. Fagnant, K. M. Kockelman, and P. Bansal, “Operations of shared
autonomous vehicle fleet for austin, texas, market,” Transportation
Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, no.
2536, pp. 98–106, 2015.
[3] D. J. Fagnant and K. M. Kockelman, “Dynamic ride-sharing and
optimal fleet sizing for a system of shared autonomous vehicles,” in
Transportation Research Board 94th Annual Meeting, no. 15-1962,
2015.
[4] J. Alonso-Mora, S. Samaranayake, A. Wallar, E. Frazzoli, and D. Rus,
“On-demand high-capacity ride-sharing via dynamic trip-vehicle assign-
ment,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, p. 201611675,
2017.
[5] S. Banerjee, R. Johari, and C. Riquelme, “Dynamic pricing in rideshar-
ing platforms,” ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 65–70,
2016.
[6] L. Chen, A. Mislove, and C. Wilson, “Peeking beneath the hood of uber,”
in Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Internet Measurement
Conference. ACM, 2015, pp. 495–508.
[7] J. Jung, R. Jayakrishnan, and J. Y. Park, “Dynamic shared-taxi dispatch
algorithm with hybrid-simulated annealing,” Computer-Aided Civil and
Infrastructure Engineering, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 275–291, 2016.
[8] M. Nourinejad and M. J. Roorda, “Agent based model for dynamic
ridesharing,” Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies,
vol. 64, pp. 117–132, 2016.
[9] J.-F. Cordeau and G. Laporte, “The dial-a-ride problem: models and
algorithms,” Annals of operations research, vol. 153, no. 1, p. 29, 2007.
[10] B. Atasoy, T. Ikeda, X. Song, and M. E. Ben-Akiva, “The concept and
impact analysis of a flexible mobility on demand system,” Transporta-
tion Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, vol. 56, pp. 373–392,
2015.
[11] S. L. Smith, M. Pavone, M. Schwager, E. Frazzoli, and D. Rus,
“Rebalancing the rebalancers: Optimally routing vehicles and drivers in
mobility-on-demand systems,” in 2013 American Control Conference.
IEEE, 2013, pp. 2362–2367.
[12] G. Aydin and J. K. Ryan, “Product line selection and pricing under the
multinomial logit choice model,” in Proceedings of the 2000 MSOM
conference. Citeseer, 2000.
[13] D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic programming and optimal control. Athena
Scientific Belmont, MA, 1995, vol. 1, no. 2.
[14] M. A. Figliozzi, H. S. Mahmassani, and P. Jaillet, “Pricing in dynamic
vehicle routing problems,” Transportation Science, vol. 41, no. 3, pp.
302–318, 2007.
[15] E. Hyytia¨, A. Penttinen, and R. Sulonen, “Non-myopic vehicle and route
selection in dynamic darp with travel time and workload objectives,”
Computers & Operations Research, vol. 39, no. 12, pp. 3021–3030,
2012.
[16] H. R. Sayarshad and J. Y. Chow, “A scalable non-myopic dynamic dial-
a-ride and pricing problem,” Transportation Research Part B: Method-
ological, vol. 81, pp. 539–554, 2015.
[17] N. Hansen and A. Ostermeier, “Completely derandomized self-
adaptation in evolution strategies,” Evolutionary computation, vol. 9,
no. 2, pp. 159–195, 2001.
[18] N. Hansen, S. D. Mu¨ller, and P. Koumoutsakos, “Reducing the time
complexity of the derandomized evolution strategy with covariance
matrix adaptation (cma-es),” Evolutionary computation, vol. 11, no. 1,
pp. 1–18, 2003.
[19] R. D. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior a Theoretical Analysis. John
Wiley and sons, 1959.
[20] D. McFadden et al., “Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice
behavior,” 1973.
[21] M. E. Ben-Akiva and S. R. Lerman, Discrete choice analysis: theory
and application to travel demand. MIT press, 1985, vol. 9.
[22] Y. Akc¸ay, H. P. Natarajan, and S. H. Xu, “Joint dynamic pricing
of multiple perishable products under consumer choice,” Management
Science, vol. 56, no. 8, pp. 1345–1361, 2010.
[23] G. Gallego and H. Topaloglu, “Constrained assortment optimization for
the nested logit model,” Management Science, vol. 60, no. 10, pp. 2583–
2601, 2014.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 9
[24] G. Gallego and R. Wang, “Multiproduct price optimization and com-
petition under the nested logit model with product-differentiated price
sensitivities,” Operations Research, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 450–461, 2014.
[25] D. Ni, Traffic Flow Theory: Characteristics, Experimental Methods, and
Numerical Techniques. Butterworth-Heinemann, 2015.
[26] N. Valev, “China gasoline prices, liter,” 2017, accessed: 2017-05-01.
[Online]. Available: www.globalpetrolprices.com/China/gasoline prices/
[27] the Innovation Center for Energy and Transportation, “China passenger
vehicle fuel consumption development annual report 2016,” Tech. Rep.,
2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.icet.org.cn/english/admin/upload/
2016092735417005.pdf
[28] the Langfang Bureau of Commodity Price, “Reply on adjustment
of urban taxi fare structure,” 2012, accessed: 2017-05-01. [Online].
Available: www.lfwjj.gov.cn/info 34 385.html
[29] the Hebei Bureau of Statistics, “Hebei citizen average income in
financial year 2015,” 2016, accessed: 2017-05-01. [Online]. Available:
http://www.hetj.gov.cn/hetj/tjsj/ndsj/101462762814980.html
[30] J. Wu, C. Nash, and D. Wang, “Is high speed rail an appropriate solution
to china’s rail capacity problems?” Journal of Transport Geography,
vol. 40, pp. 100–111, 2014.
[31] H. Zhang, “Adjustment of lowest income structure in langfang city,”
2016, accessed: 2017-05-01. [Online]. Available: http://www.lf.gov.cn/
Item/61250.aspx
[32] D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision
under risk,” Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society, pp. 263–
291, 1979.
[33] P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, and D. B. Shmoys, “Dynamic
assortment optimization with a multinomial logit choice model and
capacity constraint,” Operations research, vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 1666–1680,
2010.
[34] D. Saure´ and A. Zeevi, “Optimal dynamic assortment planning with
demand learning,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management,
vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 387–404, 2013.
[35] F. Caro and J. Gallien, “Dynamic assortment with demand learning for
seasonal consumer goods,” Management Science, vol. 53, no. 2, pp.
276–292, 2007.
Han Qiu Han Qiu received the B.E. and B.S. degrees from Tsinghua
University, Beijing, China, in 2015, and the M.S. degree from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Massachusetts, USA, in 2017. His main research
interests include human behavior and reinforcement learning.
Ruimin Li Ruimin Li is an associate professor of Institute of transportation
engineering in the Department of Civil Engineering at Tsinghua University,
China. He received his B.S. and Ph. D from the Tsinghua University in 2000
and 2005. He was born in 1979 in Shandong province, China. He joined
the Institute of Transportation Engineering, Tsinghua University in 2005.
His current research interests include intelligent transportation system, traffic
control, traffic management, traffic simulation.
Jinhua Zhao Jinhua Zhao is the Edward and Joyce Linde Associate Professor
of City and Transportation Planning at the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (MIT). Prof. Zhao brings behavioral science and transportation technology
together to shape travel behavior, design mobility system and reform urban
policies. He develops methods to sense, predict, nudge and regulate travel
behavior, and designs multimodal mobility system that integrates autonomous
vehicles, shared mobility and public transport. Prof. Zhao directs the Urban
Mobility Lab (mobility.mit.edu) at MIT.
